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The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the organizational form of an investment management firm affects the performance of the mutual funds under its operation. More explicitly, this study aims to test whether funds managed by publicly listed firms achieve different risk-adjusted performance when compared with funds operated by privately held investment firms.

This study uses Jensen's alpha to measure funds’ performance based on the Carhart’s (1997) benchmarks and market timing factors. The researchers test the relation between fund performance and organizational form using regressions. It alleviates the reverse causality and endogeneity using propensity score matching (PSM) methodology. The study investigates the difference in performance of funds managed by public firms on the post- vs pre- initial public offering (IPO) basis. Alternatively, this study tests the performance change post-public listing of the parent firm. It computes the difference for a matched sample of funds managed by private firms that were likely to go public but did not. The researchers match funds using PSM methodology.

This paper provides robust evidence that publicly traded management companies administer relatively under-performing mutual funds in comparison to those managed by privately held firms. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper that confirms that organizational decision is endogenous to performance. The study finds that after a privately held company goes public, the performance of their mutual funds and the performance of the matched group funds, whose companies remained private at the same time, tends to decline, compared with companies prior to the public offering. However, the decline in mutual fund performance is larger for the companies who chose to pursue their IPO.

The contribution of this study to the literature is twofold. First, while there is a wealth of literature on the impact of ownership structures on corporate performance, there are very few studies focused on mutual fund markets, despite the evidence that supports a generally mixed effect. This study confirms that the performance of mutual funds managed by publicly traded investments firms is lower than that of funds managed by privately held firms. Second, the organizational decision (private vs public) is not exogenous but depends on the actual funds’ performance.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of bankruptcy protection duration of Canadian public firms, and also investigate the duration for various bankruptcy outcomes including the liquidation and re-emergence of bankrupt firms.

This study uses data on all Canadian public firms that applied for bankruptcy protection over the period 1992–2014. The authors mainly apply duration and survival analyses to draw the main conclusions.

The authors find that larger and older firms with more complicated structures and issues to settle tend to remain under protection from creditors longer, and also ascertain that the fate of relatively successful companies is determined faster. Moreover, the authors report that it takes less time to achieve a final solution for firms under bankruptcy protection when interest rates are increasing and the term spread is high. Finally, firms that file for protection under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) spend longer restructuring than firms that file under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The paper investigates only publicly listed firms. The data on private firms that are required to conduct the research are not available.

Various stakeholders including regulators can predict the bankruptcy protection period using the paper’s findings. Depending on the desired outcomes (reduce uncertainly, safeguard jobs or protect creditors’ rights), specific rules can be followed.

To the authors; knowledge, this is the first paper that investigates the Canadian bankruptcy protection duration. It uses the unique Canadian framework to infer the determinants of bankruptcy protection duration and bankrupt firms’ outcomes.

This study aims to better understand the effects of speeches as a valuable communication tool for central banks. It extends the analysis of the effects of public speeches on jumps to determine whether individual speakers matter partly because of their name, position or institution.

This study detects intraday jumps using a robust-to-jump volatility estimator that accounts for deterministic seasonality. As a result, this study removes spurious jumps that occur when volatility is high and consider the relatively small jumps that occur when volatility is low. After identifying jumps, this study examines their reactions to senior official speeches and macroeconomic news surrounding the US and European Union (EU) financial crises.

Despite having the most influential individual speakers, this study finds that the impact of the Federal Reserve (Fed) and European Central Bank (ECB) is mitigated because the two institutions have a relatively small impact on currency jumps. This finding shows that the speaker’s name is more important than his or her institution affiliation. While the Federal Reserve Bank President and Chief Executive, as well as ECB board members, significantly reduce jump sizes, particularly during the EU crisis period, both the Fed Chairman and the ECB President increase the magnitude of the jump in both the US crisis and noncrisis periods, contributing to market instability.

The implications of the results include international portfolio management, currency derivatives pricing and hedging, risk management and market efficiency.

The findings contribute to a better understanding of the effects of senior official speech attributes on currency jumps in various economic states. The results raise questions about the speaker’s name, institution and position’s effectiveness in calming markets and reducing uncertainty.

This paper aims to analyze the effects of internal and external governance mechanisms on the performance and risk taking of banks from the Euro zone before and after the 2008 financial crisis.

To avoid macroeconomic problems and shocks and because of data availability, the authors select some countries of the Euro zone, namely, France, Belgium, Germany and Finland, during the 2004-2009 period. These countries share similar macroeconomic environments (unemployment, inflation and economic growth rates). All the data relating to the banks are manually drawn from the supervising reports submitted to banks and are available on the banks’ websites and/or on that of the AMF website. The banks included in our sample are drawn from the list of European central banks on www.ecb.int

The empirical results show that banks undertake tradeoffs between different governance mechanisms to alleviate the intensity of the agency conflicts between the shareholders and managers. The findings also confirm that internal mechanisms and capital regulations are complementary and significantly impact bank performance.

This analysis can be extended through studying the interaction between bondholders’ governance and shareholders’ governance and their impact on the 2008 financial crisis.

The changes in banking governance help banks find a useful and necessary way to avoid ill-considered risks that can cause a systemic risk. Therefore, some conditions should be met so that banking governance can contribute to the economic development.

Culture and mentality of good banking governance must grow as much as possible through awareness-raising, training, promotion, recognition of performance, enhancing procedure transparency and stability of good banking governance and regulations, strengthening the national capacity to fight against corruption, and preventive mechanisms.

This paper complements previous studies, mainly those of Andres and Vallelado (2008) who examine the impact of the components of the board on banking performance and of Laeven and Levine (2009) who estimate the combined effect of regulatory and ownership structure on the risk-taking of each bank.